Introduction
is 'rising'. Others, and some very important ones too, suggest it is not (yet). If one uses, for instance, standard and intuitively plausible macro-indicators of power -economic growth and military spending --it is unclear that China is actually rising, by which I mean, catching up to the system hegemon, the U.S. While one could argue that perception is reality so it is irrelevant whether or not traditional material indicators of power show China to be rising, different judgments about whether or not China is rising have real world implications.
I begin the paper by outlining some of the conceptual and empirical "pluralism" (some might say confusion) that characterizes the rising China discourse. I then show that in the China Chinese analysts are well use to this discourse. Figure 3 shows the frequency of articles in Chinese academic journals from 1989-2007 that mention "China's rise" ( ) and/or "rising China" ( ). Chinese analysts pay attention to claims outside of China about China's rise as well. Some of this attention is out of worry that the rising discourse will feed into 'China threat' discourses. But some of it clearly affirms the perceptions of some Chinese, or at least feeds the obsession with how outsiders perceive China.
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Despite the rise of the rising China discourse, there does not seem to be much consensus about where this leaves China vis à vis the US. One hears in the American discourse terms such as "superpower" or "peer" or "near peer competitor" to describe how China's rise has repositioned the PRC vis à vis the US. Hillary Clinton recently called China a "global superpower". 3 Bates Gill refers to China as "a rising star in the constellation of great powers". 4 There are some even more extravagant claims that China is already remaking the world in ways that can't be measured by "the tired rules of how many aircraft carriers she has or on per-capita 2 See the analysis of the recent Forbes issue on "China as Number One", Li Jiesi, " GDP leads to devastating mis-measurement." 5 Rather, in terms of comprehensive national power "China is already a rival of the United States in many important areas." 6 Others are a bit more restrained. Avery Goldstein refers to China as a "rising but not yet risen power". 7 David Kang writes that China is a "major regional power" 8 that is "already a major actor in East Asia, and by some measures it is already the largest and most powerful". 9
Chinese characterizations of China's status or position ( ) vis à vis other major players are somewhat restrained. One of the more expansive descriptions comes from a scholar attached to the Foreign Affairs University who has referred to China as a "cross-regional major power" ). 10 Some have referred to China after decades of rapid economic development as a "regional major power with global influence" ( ).
Others are more circumspect. According to a well-respected Shanghai intellectual with considerable access to the policy process, China is merely a "developing major power starting to have an impact on Asian regional affairs" ( ) 11 .
Still others argue that indeed there has been a growth in hard power (economic, military) but China's ranking in 'soft power' is very low (in terms of "informationization", not "attractiveness"
as Nye uses "soft power"). But like a lot of conventional wisdom, the characterization of China as "rising" may be a convention now but it may not be so wise. The problem is, no one has examined the conventional wisdom in much detail. As I noted, the "rising China" discourse tends to lack definitions of "rising". There are a range of explicit and implicit definitions "out there". As it has been used in various sources, rising can mean:
• vis à vis a state's past. This idea is captured by the Chinese terms fuxing (revival, rejuvenation, resurgence), zhuanxing (transformation), or zhenxing ((re-)vitalization) that are sometimes used to describe the effects of China's recent growth. All these changes are in relation to China's past as a powerful state weakened dramatically by external threats and internal chaos in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries.
• a state's capabilities constitute an increasing portion of a more powerful state's capabilities (e.g. China's capabilities as a percentage of US power capabilities)
• a state's capabilities are closing in on a more powerful state's capabilities (e.g. the absolute gap between China's capabilities and those of the US is shrinking).
• a state is engaged in a rapid emergence; it is getting bigger, or getting more of some key resource(s). This notion captured by the term for rise most commonly used by the Chinese -jueqi . 13 The key character is the first one which means an abrupt or towering rise. • a state is challenging the dominant norms of the "international order" (e.g. the "Beijing Consensus" challenges the 'Western model' of development and international order which, in macro-historical terms, cannot logically be a permanent feature of international relations
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).
• "a state or a strategic actor rapidly increasing its own power in a short period of time, and thus achieving a notable international position/status".
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• a state whose leaders (or the leaders of other states) expect its economic development to be so rapid that it moves quickly into the ranks of the most powerful states in the system. 20 (This would certainly seem to characterize the discourse about China's rise describe above).
• a state "which augments its power through the formation of a tight network of alliances, creating a bloc" 21 (This is probably less relevant to current discourses about China's rise, though some regard Chinese coordination with the Russians in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has having anti-American elements).
• a state that rapidly expands its size through conquest is,provide confirming evidence of China's rise and ignore or discount any possible disconfirming evidence. 24 The indicators used in the rising China discourse have been quite varied, and include:
• the correlates of war national capabilities index;
• exchange rate GDP;
• PPP GDP,
• GDP growth rates;
• inward and outward FDI flows;
• trade volume and composition;
• military spending;
• military force modernization;
• levels of involvement in multilateral institutions;
• amount of travel abroad by Chinese;
• attractiveness of Chinese cultural products.
• global public opinion polling concerning positive images of the PRC.
There is no doubt that on all of these indicators China has been growing, increasing, expanding, becoming more pro-active. But the key question is how all this change compares to the capabilities, impact, and influence of the system hegemon.
Of course, perception is reality. and ask whether in fact some perceptions need to be changed. Put differently, my point is a pedagogical one -we need to think carefully about how we conceive of rising power before we use the term in the China case. Its loose use has political consequences.
Rising power
For a concept that is so central to the international relation discipline and to policymaking (especially for major powers), it is surprising that there is no consensus on how to define or measure rising power. 25 It seems to me that a common sense way of thinking about rising In fact, this pattern is not unusual. As Figure 6 shows, the US didn't start to 'rise' vis à vis the most powerful state in the system -Great Britain --until the early1870s. Its power as a portion of Great Britain's power was increasing after the Civil War even as the absolute gap in capabilities increasingly favored Great Britain. Figure 7 shows that Germany also didn't start to rise vis à vis Britain until later in the 1870s, even though its power as a portion of Great Britain's began increasing from the 1850s on. It strains the concept of rising to conclude that in the period prior to the tipping point the US and Germany/Prussia were rising when Great Britain's absolute advantage in capabilities was actually increasing. If the periods prior to this tipping point are characterized as periods of an American rise or a German/Prussian rise, then we would also have to characterize any state with a growth rate faster than the US today (and some chance of sustaining those growth rates over the long term) as a rising power as well. That doesn't seem to make intuitive sense to me. 
Relative and absolute change in the Sino-US power relationship
As it turns out that there appears to be a similar pattern in the China-US case today as found in the hypothetical case in Figure 5 and in the historical cases outline above -namely in increase in China's power as a portion of the US but also an increase in the American absolute advantage in power capabilities. This pattern holds for a wide range of standard indicators that one might use measuring power -GDP, military spending, and a range of indicators of scientifictechnical development.
1 GDP

According to the World Bank Development Indicators data set, in current US dollars
China's GDP as a percent of the US GDP has gone from about 13% in 2001 to almost 20% in 2006. The absolute difference in GDP, however, has increased in the US favor from about $8.8
trillion to about $10.5 trillion over this same period, a 20% increase (see Figure 8 ). Figure 9 projects out China's GDP as a percent of the US GDP and the absolute difference in GDPs using a very optimistic unchanging estimate for PRC GDP growth of 10%/year. 28 Note that China falls further behind the US in terms of the absolute amount of capabilities until around 2014.
Thereafter begins the period of China's rise as the absolute difference begins to shrink. and Chinese GDP -a 3.5%/10% scenario, a 4%/8% scenarios, and a 3.5%/8% scenario. Note that slowing down China's relative growth rate slightly can lead to a substantial delay in the tipping point and the start of China's rise. Prior to these tipping points American power accretes. In the 10/3.5 scenario the US advantage in economic capabilities grows by 33% before the tipping point is reached. In the 8/4 scenario the US advantage grows 93% before the tipping point. It would be odd to describe periods where American power accretes in an absolute sense as periods in which China is a rising power. 
2 Military spending
The same pattern shows up in trends in US and Chinese military spending. As Figure 11 shows, using SIPRI data, China's spending as a percentage of US spending has increased quite steadily. This is particularly the case from the mid 1990s on, when China began to gear up for Taiwan At least four conclusions flow from the discussion thus far. First, China has more material power capabilities compared to its past. Relative to its own history, China is clearly 'rising'. Second, in comparison to the US hegemon, however, it is not clear that China is rising.
Indeed, one might even conclude that that China is less powerful vis à vis the US than it has been in the past, and it will continue to decline in relative terms through to least 2016 and possibly 2031. Third, and related, the best one can say is that China is putting itself on a trajectory whereby in about 5 years (optimistically) or 23 years (less optimistically) it will be rising vis à vis the US. Put differently, it is a potential rising power, and will become one should it maintain substantially higher growth rates than the US. Fourth, China is more powerful today than it has been vis à vis other nations around its periphery. It is, therefore, 'rising' with regard to Japan, as Figure 19 indicates. China's GDP as a portion of Japan's is increasing, and the absolute gap favoring Japan is narrowing. China is catching up to Japan. China also appears to be right at the tipping point where it will begin to rise vis à vis Europe (Figure 20 ). What is the Beijing consensus, though? The person who coined the term and developed the argument, Joshua Ramos claims it is a pragmatic rejection of one-size-fits-all development strategies, and that it wants to temper any marketization processes with state-directed efforts to protect equality and social welfare. 36 Others claim it is authoritarianism plus socialized capitalism.
A young Shanghai academic suggests that the China model or Beijing consensus is an alternative to Westernization for the developing world wishing "to grasp the opportunities of globalization". More fundamentally, the Beijing Consensus appears to be an intriguing example of the invention, reification, branding, and selling of a myth. While the term was developed by a foreigner, the Beijing Consensus idea seems to serve a useful purpose for Chinese nationalists to claim that there is a difference between US hegemony and China's rise -one is reactionary and one is progressive --without, of course, seriously examining this alleged difference.
With more careful comparative research on Chinese soft power over time and space we may well find that the peak of China's ideological attractiveness was in the 1960s when the Maoist model of revolution and revolutionary development inspired movements and countries in many parts of the developing world out of reach of traditional tools of Chinese state power. And it compelled the US to commit to a long and costly war in Vietnam.
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Conclusion: Why It Matters
Just because it may be the case that according to a moderately rigorous common sense definition of rising power China is not (yet) rising, this does not mean that the increasing size of the China's economy or the modernization of its military capabilities has little consequence. I am not resurrecting Gerald Segal's 1999 argument that China does not matter much in international relations, that it is a "second-rank middle power that has mastered the art of diplomatic theater". 40 To quote Thomas Christensen's words, made in a somewhat related context, China is increasingly capable of "posing problems without catching up". 41 China may not yet be rising vis à vis the power capabilities of the US hegemon, but the effects of the PRC's economic growth on environmental degradation or primary product prices are obvious (an effect magnified, of course, Why worry about the gap between the discourse and any reality of China's rise? It may well be all a matter of perception. What really matters is that people have expectations about
China's trajectory -these expectations being a product of rough rules of thumb and measurement heuristics. After all, the Soviets traditionally talked about "correlation of forces". Mao Zedong and Chinese leaders asked who was on the "offensive" and who was on the "defensive" when measuring which superpower was rising or declining. Sometimes it was steel production and technology that mattered most in Mao's calculations (as in the late 1950s when he declared that the East Wind was prevailing over the West wind, that is, the socialist camp was surpassing or had surpassed the imperialist camp). Sometimes it was measured more by morale, spiritual drive, the voluntarism of a people, or its vanguard Party. Clearly there is a shared perception that China is rising, so why not leave it at that analytically?
The risk comes from the interactive effects of our discursive choices on Sino-US relations. If American leaders think China is rising, while Chinese leaders don't believe it so much, then the US response -presumably to constrain this rise --will seem to the latter to be an unjustified over-reaction, a challenge to China's legitimate interests. The US then may help create revisionist interests in China. If American leaders don't think China is rising, while Chinese leaders believe it is, then the US response may seem insufficiently respectful, ignoring China's legitimate status. If American leaders don't believe China is rising, while Chinese leaders believe it is, and act to ensure it does, then the US may be shocked by a power transition down the road.
If neither American nor Chinese leaders believe China is rising, then presumably the effect will be to dampen security dilemma dynamics in the relationship.
